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PAPER ON THE "NEW HISTORIOGRAPHY" OF MATHEMATICS 
BY HERBERT MEHRTENS, HAMBURG 
SUMMARIES 
A discussion of the applicability of the concepts 
of T. S. Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, 
stimulated by the statement by M. J. Crowe of ten 
"laws" concerning change in the history of mathe- 
matics. The concepts "revolution" and "crisis" are 
rejected, while the concepts centering around the 
sociology of the scientific community are accepted 
for systematic use in historiography of mathematics. 
This is supplemented by the consideration of extra- 
mathematical influences. Finally the "laws" of Crowe 
are shown to be explainable with those concepts. 
Angeregt durch zehn "Gesetze," die M. J. Crowe 
fiir die Entwicklung der Mathematik aufstellte, wird 
die Anwendbarkeit der Begriffe aus T. S. Kuhn's 
Theorie der wissenschaftlichen Revolutionen auf die 
Mathematik diskutiert. Die Begriffe "Revolution" 
und "Krise" werden zuriickgewiesen, wahrend jene 
Begriffe fiir einen systematischen Gebrauch in der 
Mathematikgeschichte akzeptiert werden, die die 
Soziologie der wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft 
betreffen. Erg;inzend werden aussermathematische 
Einfliisse diskutiert. Schliesslich werden Crowes 
"Gesetze" mit Hilfe der entwickelten Begriffe erklzrt. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a paper published recently in Historia Mathematics 
M. J. Crowe tried "to stimulate discussion of the historio- 
graphy of mathematics by asserting ten 'laws' concerning change 
in mathematics." [Crowe 1975, 1621. His starting point is the 
"new historiography of science", whose basic book is T. S. Kuhn's 
essay The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [1970a], the first 
edition of which appeared in 1962. There has been much dis- 
cussion on Kuhn's theses since. Eventually Kuhn had to refine 
some of his concepts, which was done in the important Postscript 
1969 to the second edition of his book and in future papers 
[1970b, 197Oc]. 
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Kuhn states that “historians of science have begun to ask 
new sorts of questions and to trace different . . . lines of 
development” [ 1970, 31. Here is the core of what has been 
called the “new historiography” of science. Historians of sci- 
ence explicitely take up the conceptual and theoretical back- 
ground mainly from philosophy and sociology. They try to pose 
good and fruitful questions in order to gain a broad and ade- 
quate understanding of how the sciences and mathematics develop. 
For the field of mathematics Crowe has pointed to two impor- 
tant examples, namely, a paper of I. Lakatos [1963/64] and the 
studies of R. L. Wilder [1968, 19741. Crowe’ s own “laws”, 
though, leave the questions still to be asked and provide little 
conceptual material for a better understanding of the history 
of mathematics. 
Still the “laws” point to some important regularities that 
have incited me to take up the discussion. I shall try in this 
paper to tie up those regularities in a conceptual frame that 
is basically Kuhnian. 
In the main part I shall discuss the applicability of Kuhn’s 
theory and concepts to the history of mathematics. Starting 
with a short description of Kuhn’s theory, I shall then discuss 
the concepts in connection with mathematics, going from the 
general pattern of change, revolutions, crises, through more 
specific concepts like the scientific community, to the differ- 
ent elements of the disciplinary matrix. Section 3 will turn 
to extramathematical influences, and in section 4 Crowe’s “laws” 
will be discussed in terms of the concepts developed in the paper. 
2. Kuhn's Concepts and their Applicability to Mathematics 
2.1. Kuhn's theory 
Kuhn’s basic concept is that of the “scientific community.” 
“A scientific community consists . . . of the practitioners of 
a scientific specialty. To an extent unparalleled in most other 
fields, they have undergone similar educations and professional 
initiations; in the process they have absorbed the same tech- 
nical literature and drawn many of the same lessons from it . . . 
Within such groups communication is relatively full and pro- 
fessional judgement relatively unanimous. . . . Communities in 
this sense exist, of course, at numerous levels. The most 
global is the community of all scientists.” [Kuhn 1970a, 1771 
The group is constituted by the common background of its 
members. That is what Kuhn called the “paradigm” of the specialty 
“A paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share, 
and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who 
share a paradigm.” [ibid., 1761 This concept found many critics, 
and Kuhn had to refine it into the “disciplinary matrix”: “‘dis- 
ciplinary’ because it refers to the common possession of the 
practioners of a particular discipline, ‘matrix’ because it is 
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composed of ordered elements of various sorts, each requiring 
further specification.” [ibid., 1821 
As elements of the disciplinary matrix Kuhn lists the 
following four (though there are more): 
-- “symbolic generalizations”, expressions like f=ma that are 
legislative as well as definitional [ibid., 182-1831, 
-- “beliefs in particular models”, like the belief that heat 
is the kinetic energy of the constituent parts of bodies 
[ibid., 1841, 
-- “values” about the qualities of theories, of predictions, 
of the presentation of scientific subject matter, etc. [ibid., 
184-61, 
-- “examplars” or “paradigms”, concrete problem solutions that 
show how the job should be done [ibid., 187-911. 
Kuhn now distinguishes two main forms in the development 
of science: “normal” and “revolutionary” (or “extraordinary”) 
science. 
Along the lines of the accepted disciplinary matrix the 
scientist is able to choose problems which are relevant and 
solvable with high probability . The elements of the discipli- 
nary matrix act like rules in assuring the solvability of the 
prob 1 em. Furthermore the exemplars provide the guidelines for 
research. This kind of work is like “puzzle-solving.” A failure 
to solve such a normal problem will be attributed to lack of 
patience or intelligence in the scientist. Only after such 
failures become spectacular - either because of the reputation 
of those who tried or because of their number - will the elements 
of the disciplinary matrix be questioned. The type of research 
where no spectacular problems turn up is “a strenouos and de- 
voted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied 
by professional education” [Kuhn 1970a, 51. Kuhn calls it 
“normal science.” To him the “puzzle-solving” is the demarca- 
tion criterion for mature sciences. 
Regularly nature shows “anomalies”, phenomena that turn 
out to be resistant to the customary pigeon-holing. Often 
such phenomena are laid aside for later generations with better 
tools. Sometimes the persistent failure to deal with an anomaly 
leads to small deviations in the disciplinary matrix which 
eventually allow integrating the anomaly in a fairly “normal” 
way in the theory. If this does not happen, the scienti.fit 
community is disturbed. Its members gradually come to recog- 
nize that there is something wrong with their basic beliefs. 
This is the state of “crisis” in the scientific community. The 
otherwise strong bonds of the disciplinary matrix tend to be 
loosened, and basically new theories and solutions, new “para- 
digms” may evolve. 
There is no rational choice between the old and the new 
paradigm. The reasons for the choice of a theory (explanatory 
power, fruitfulness, elegance, etc.) act rather as values than 
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as rules of choice. A shift of paradigm is like a “gestalt- 
switch”; the scientists perceive nature in different ways. The 
concepts, symbolic generalizations, etc., if retained in the 
new paradigm, have a different meaning because of a new lin- 
guistic context. This incommensurability thesis has been much 
discussed; its elaboration by Kuhn [197Oc, 259-2771 shows the 
way he views scientific development very clearly. 
Kuhnian revolutions are not only fundamental changes in 
world view occurring once every century. Revolutions are “a 
little studied type of conceptual change which occurs frequently 
in science and is fundamental to its advance.” [Kuhn 197Oc, 
249-501 Toulmin has used the word “micro-revolutions” for this 
[Toulmin 1970, 471. The revolutions are always seen with res- 
pect to a scientific community which may be very small; and 
revolutions may involve only parts of the disciplinary matrix. 
2.2. The Application of Kuhn's Concepts to Mathematics 
2.2.1. The Pattern of Scientific Change 
Kuhn’s starting point is the social psychology (or sociology) 
of the normal scientific community. The counterpart of the 
scientific communi t)- is nature. From this he develops his dual- 
istic view of scientific change. 
In principle this is transferable to mathematics. Without 
going into the question of whether mathematics is in any way 
concerned with nature, one can say that mathematics is about 
something that offers resistance to the mathematician and calls 
for treatment. More than in the natural sciences the problems 
to be treated are determined by mathematics itself. But this 
is only a difference of degree. The relation between the mathe- 
maticians and their subject is very much like that of the natural 
sciences. 
Kuhn takes the scientific community as clearly identifiable, 
relatively isolated within the greater communities, and as rela- 
tively free from extra-scientific influences. This turns his 
whole theory into a strong idealization that has found severe 
criticism from historians of science [cf., e.g., Meyer 19741. 
If there is any such pattern of change in mathematics, it is 
certainly not easily seen. There are intertwining developments 
of different mathematical disciplines, extramathematical influ- 
ences of various kinds, and so on. There does not appear to be 
a general pattern of change in mathematics that can be applied 
in historiography. But there are many regularities (as Crowe’s 
“laws” show) and these can be treated and partly explained by 
Kuhn’s concepts. Thus I will discuss the applicability of the 
concepts, starting with “revolution” and going to the elements 
of the “disciplinary matrix.” 
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2.2.2. Revolutions 
In the application of Kuhn’s concepts to mathematics there 
are generally two questions involved: is there such a thing in 
mathematics? and if so, is the concept of definite, fruitful 
use in the historiography of mathematics? First, are there 
revolutions in mathematics? Consider this example: 
Until well into the Nineteenth Century the Cambridge and 
Oxford dons regarded any attempt at improvement of the theory 
of fluxions as an impious revolt against the sacred memory of 
Newton. The result was that the Newtonian school of England 
and the Leibnizian school of the continent drifted apart . . . 
The dilemma was broken in 1812 by a group of young mathematician: 
at Cambridge who, under the inspiration of the older Robert 
Woodhouse, formed an "Analytical Society" to propagate the dif- 
ferential notation. . . . This movement met initially with severe 
criticism, which was overcome by such actions as the publication 
of an English translation of Lacroix' “Elementary Treatise on 
the Differential and Integral Calculus” (1816) . The new genera- 
tion in England now began to participate in modern mathematics. 
[Struik 1948, 246-81 
For the English mathematical community this was a revolu- 
tion. A substantial part of the disciplinary matrix, the com- 
mitment to the Newtonian system of notation, was overthrown. 
This is but one very suggestive example, and there are more. 
Still, Crowe holds that there are no revolutions in mathe- 
matics [“law” 10 in Crowe 1975, 1651. He would probably reject 
the given example by saying that this is not a revolution in 
mathematics. To him “the preposition ‘in’ is crucial” [ibid., 
1661. Unfortunately he does not explain what in mathematics 
means, except that nomenclature, symbolism, metamathematics, 
methodology, and historiography are not in mathematics. Pro- 
bably Crowe has the “contents” or the “substance” of mathematics 
in mind (what is this?). 
But take an example: a piece of mathematics very much in 
the sense of Crowe would be Taylor’s theorem, which has been 
invariably valid since its publication in 1715. But is it of 
the same content in Taylor’s original publication and in modern 
textbooks? There is always a wide background connected with 
such a theorem. Today the function concept is completely dif- 
ferent, infinitesimal analysis is set up on the basis of general 
topology, with Taylor’s theorem the mathematician has a general- 
ization to Banach spaces in mind, and so forth. Still there is 
something more than mere tradition connecting the theorem of 
1715 and that of today. The example should show that this “con- 
tent” is difficult to grasp. One cannot possibly strip the 
contents from nomenclature, symbolism, metamathematics, etc. 
There is a danger for the historian of mathematics in this 
preposition in. The mathematician of today tends to declare 
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all history the prehistory of the mathematics he knows. Thus 
everything which is included in or derivable from modern mathe- 
matics is in mathematics. The historically significant features 
like the use of concepts, the general beliefs concerning the 
discipline, etc. are naturally not in mathematics. Crowe has 
shown that he is not guilty of such a standpoint. But I should 
Very much like to know how he explains his preposition “in”. 
To close the discussion of this point I shall take up 
another example. Take, say, van der Waerden’s Moderne Algebra 
of 1930 and any algebra textbook of the 1830s. The difference 
is striking; the complete set of the closely connected realms 
of contents, terminology, symbolism, methodology, and the impli- 
cit metamathematics has changed. All these elements are inter- 
woven : a concept, e.g., is not only determined by its proper 
content as given in the definition, but it also is determined 
by the connexions in which it is used. Thus there is a “meta- 
physics” to it. Furthermore every single one of the elements 
is substantial to the theory as it historically occurs. Con- 
sequently, I should say that changes in methodology, symbolism, 
etc., are changes in mathematics. 
Few, if any, mathematical theories have been completely 
overthrown, but many theories have become obsolete or have been 
modified to an extent that there is hardly any resemblance. 
These changes have frequently been the consequence of an inter- 
play of changes in the “contents” and the “metaphysics” of a 
discipline. An example is the transformation of classical alge- 
bra to modern algebra, the “death” of invariant theory [cf. Fisher 
1966, 19671 being a part of this general development. 
So far I have shown that there are events in the history 
of mathematics that might be termed “revolutions” and that there 
is no point in distinguishing such events with respect to their 
being “in” mathematics or somewhere else. The example of a 
“revolutionary” development which opened this section is very 
suggestive, because in this case the connotations of the word 
“revolution” are appropriate. There are many words which can 
be used to express the historical importance of an event; “re- 
volution” is one of these. The implicit analogy to political 
history is a means of expression for the historian as a writer. 
Rut if one is looking for a concept that is to play a methodo- 
logical role in historiography, guiding and helping research 
and interpretation in the history of mathematics, this imagina- 
tive force of such a connotation-laden word is rather a danger. 
This is obvious when one comes to talk of “micro-revolutions.” 
Here the connotations are certainly misleading. 
This answers the second question, whether the concept is 
useful. After I have rejected Kuhn’s dualistic scheme as a 
general pattern for the historical development of mathematics 
there is nothing left to justify the use of the concept of ‘Ire- 
volution” as part of a methodically applied conceptual frame. 
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It would be very nice to have such a conceptual frame for the 
classification (and explanation) of types of change in the his- 
tory of mathematics. I know of none. My proposal is to use 
the concept of “normal” mathematics (which will be discussed 
below) as a tool in the assessment of mathematical innovations: 
relate the innovation to the contemporary mathematical background 
(the disciplinary matrix), see if it is a piece of normal mathe- 
matics, and if it is not, treat it individually, finding out 
what exactly is non-normal about it and why this is so. 
2.2.3. Crises 
Like “revolution” the concept of “crisis” has its main 
value as part of Kuhn’s pattern of scientific development. Not 
accepting this general pattern for mathematics one can still 
debate the role of Kuhnian crises. They mark the phenomenon 
that in a given mathematical community - for whatever reasons - 
the common commitments of the group are questioned and, conse- 
quent ly, the stability of this social system is at risk. The 
mathematicians will be more apt to develop ideas deviating from 
the common background of their group and stimuli from outside 
the community will be more easily accepted. In this way one 
can perceive crises as functional for scientific development. 
We know of crises in mathematics, the so-called “foundation 
crises.“[l] Lacking space to elaborate this, I can only state 
that I doubt that a functional view of these crises as explained 
above is historically adequate. This is partly the result of 
an ambiguity of the term in its intuitive application to mathe- 
matics. It means always a social crisis of the community of 
mathematicians; but it is also seen as a crisis of mathematics, 
which implies that if a basic logical contradiction turns up, 
then there is a crisis. The problem with the concept thus is 
to see what historical evidence can justify the use of the term 
“crisis .‘I Having no solution to this problem and with strong 
doubts about the possibility of using the concept in historical 
explanations (concerning mathematics), I should rather not give 
it a systematic use [Z]. 
The remaining problem is how the functions of crises in 
Kuhn’s scheme are accomplished in mathematics. For one thing 
as Crowe has stated [“law” 9 in 1975, 1651 and Lakatos 
i;963,‘64, h as illustrated -- mathematicians have a vast repertoire 
of techniques for handling problems that might generate crises. 
One of these techniques is to ignore foundational problems and 
to rely on the applicability or the fruitfulness of mathematical 
concepts and theories. Further the mathematical communities 
are open systems. The interaction of the mathematical disci- 
plines and their relation to extra-mathematical fields as well 
as the variance among the individual mathematicians allows basic 
changes in the long run without going through crises of the whole 
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community [ 31. The following sections will elaborate some of 
these ideas. 
2.2.4. Anomalies 
Anomalies are phenomena that do not follow the expectations 
from the accepted disciplinary matrix. A prominent example in 
mathematics is Euclid’s fifth postulate, which eventually led 
to new geometries and to the overthrow of the “metaphysics” of 
geometry. 
The example shows that anomalies play a decisive role in 
the history of mathematics. As stated above anomalies frequently 
can be handled by existing techniques. Often concepts are modi- 
fied to integrate or to exclude anomalies (cf. Lakatos’ “monster- 
barring” ; [ 1963/64]). Inquiries into the ways mathematicians 
react to anomalies can give valuable background to the historio- 
graphy of mathematics. 
’ ‘Anoma 1 y” is a relative term. It points to the relation 
between a phenomenon and the expectations and the background 
of the mathematicians. As such it is an important concept for 
the assessment of the background and of innovations in the his- 
tory of mathematics. The fifth postulate did not agree with the 
characteristic self-evidence of Euclidean axiom and postulates. 
It led to the abandonment of the belief in one unique geometry, 
resting on self-evident assumptions. 
A less familiar example is the invention of ideal primes 
and ideals by Kummer and Dedekind. Kummer tried to prove Fermat’s 
theorem (which itself is an anomaly in number theory). He 
applied techniques acquired only recently in the realm of com- 
plex integers. His expectation was that the methods and theorems 
of the theory of natural numbers should be extendable to alge- 
braic integers. So he came to the erroneous idea that these 
were uniquely resolvable into prime factors. After the error 
had been pointed out to him by Dirichlet, he tried to integrate 
this anomaly and invented his ideal primes, more exactly the 
divisibility by ideal primes. Dedekind took up Kummer’s line 
of research, attempting to develop a general theory of algebraic 
integers along the lines of classical number theory in the form 
given to it by Gauss and Dirichlet. Retaining the concept of 
congruence in its central place, he tried to develop the theory 
in terms of higher congruences. But in this approach he en- 
countered further anomalies. Eventually he was led to the in- 
vention of the concept of “ideal”, completing the theory by the 
use of “fields” and “modules”. This solution, reached only 
after years of strenuous work, was a deviation from the usual 
background in that the new entities were non-constructively 
defined sets of numbers. In summary, algebraic number theory 
was developed by the interplay of the force of the leading prin- 
ciples given by Gaussian number theory on one hand and the ano- 
malies showing up in different fields of algebraic numbers on 
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the other hand. This very rough sketch should have shown the 
often important role of anomalies [6]. 
There are many more examples of different degrees of con- 
spi cuousness . The reaction of the mathematical community to 
an anomaly depends on the strength of beliefs that are violated 
by the anomaly. On the Pythagorean background the incom- 
mensurable must have been scandalous. But the background does 
not have to be that of the whole community. An unspectacular 
example is E. Schrtjder’s proof of the independence of dis- 
tributivity in the axiomatics of Boolean algebra [4]. Schriider 
had given distributivity as an axiom in his first presentation 
of the algebra of logic [SchrGder 18771. C. S. Peirce, whom 
Schrijder admired very much, in a paper of 1880 affirmed dis- 
tributivity as a theorem but omitted the proof. Related to 
SchrZjder’s expectations this was highly anomalous, and conse- 
quently he gave the matter much consideration. He was led to 
the division into the two distributive inequalities and found 
the proof for one. By a model taken from his other researches 
he managed to show the other one to be unprovable. These 
inquiries made him see the applicability of the structure de- 
fined by those axioms that in his setup came before the law 
of distributivity. He stated the concept of a lattice 
(with 0 and 1) which he called “logischer Kalkul mit Gruppen” 
and applied it to problems of today’s universal algebra 
[Schrijder 1890, I, Anhang 4-61. The anomaly thus had led to 
interesting developments, which nevertheless were without 
effect on the history of mathematics: almost nobody was inter- 
ested in structures generalizing Boolean algebra for the 
following thirty years. Schriider had not given any other proofs 
of independence. But soon the modern axiomatic method made 
these a standard procedure and the law of distributivity was 
no longer an anomaly. Peirce’s proof, which he eventually 
produced, just rested on another axiom. 
This example should show, besides the role of an anomaly, 
the general pattern of my application of Kuhn’s concepts. I 
have rejected the concepts “revolution” and “crisis” in spite 
of the existence of phenomena that might bear these names. 
The reason was that these concepts cannot be formed into force- 
ful tools for historical inquiries. I believe and have tried 
to show that the concept of “anomaly” is such a tool. It is 
a clue to important causal connections. Relating innovations 
in mathematics to the contemporary background, it helps to 
understand and assess historical developments. 
2.2.5. Normal Science 
The kind of work Kuhn calls “normal science” is done in 
mathematics, too. For example, most doctoral theses are “normal” 
“normal” mathematics. A thesis is decisive for the academic 
career, and consequently there is a strong tendency to take up 
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problems that promise to be solvable by standard methods. Most 
of mathematics is done in a normal way following the rules 
learnt from the usual texts, solving standard problems, filling 
holes in a theory, generalizing concepts, sharpening conditions, 
etc. The elegant, comprehensive, streamlined, final textbook 
version of a theory is only attained after a period of normal 
research on the theory. This normal type of research is fur- 
thermore a sign showing that a discipline or theory has become 
an accepted part of mathematical work. 
Adequate description of normal mathematics in history is 
a difficult problem. There is a normal tendency to concentrate 
on the great mathematicians and their discoveries and to over- 
look normal mathematics. This is unsatisfactory, but an 
attempt to describe a development in mathematics completely- 
may result in an unreadable collection of facts. A possibility 
to avoid this dilemma might be the generalizing description 
of the main streams in the normal work on a theory, using the 
elements that are guiding the normal work (which will be dis- 
cussed below under the heading “elements of the disciplinary 
matrix”). 
Since I do not want to talk about “revolutionary” mathe- 
matics, one might object that there is nothing left but normal 
mathematics. But “normal” is, like “anomaly”, a relative 
term. It relates a piece of mathematical work to the contem- 
porary “norms” . A mathematical paper can be extraordinary 
in many ways: in the choice of the problem, in the applied 
methods, in the extension of known concepts, and so forth. 
For a proper understanding of the historical status of a 
mathematical contribution it is essential to see exactly what 
is non-normal about it and to find out how this could come about 
2.2.6. Scientific community [3] 
The foremost value of the concept of scientific community 
is that it does away with the impression which often can be 
won from discussions on mathematics and its history, namely, 
that mathematics is a package of eternal, spiritual truths 
gradually unwrapping itself in the course of history, visible 
only to the inner eye of singular geniuses who make them 
accessible to diligent research students. In fact mathematics 
is man-made; its vital basis is the social interaction of 
mathematicians in their scientific community. No mathematician 
starts from nothing. He has to build up on mathematical tradi- 
tion. In the course of his mathematical education, be it 
formal or otherwise, he acquires a “tacit knowledge” about 
mathematics, the way to talk about it, its aims and methods, 
etc., which enable him to communicate with his fellow mathe- 
maticians. He becomes a member of their community, more or 
less conforming to its way of doing things and to its norms. 
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He strives for recognition by his colleagues. Even outsiders 
such as H. Grassmann try to get their message across to the 
mathematical community, in Grassmann's case by the elaboration 
of his Ausdehnungslehre in a second edition. 
I am not trying to explain everything about mathematics 
in social or sociological terms. Much depends on the personal 
biography of a mathematician, which seldom can be investigated 
closely enough. Furthermore there are phenomena which seem 
not explainable at all, at least not in any satisfying way. 
Nevertheless the social conditions, especially those of the 
closer community of mathematicians, are the basis of the de- 
velopment of mathematics. 
In spite of this basic value of the concept of scientific 
community, there are serious shortcomings to it. It is cer- 
tainly applicable to the mathematics of the twentieth century 
in the sense of Kuhn that first the community is to be identi- 
fied and then the disciplinary matrix. But going back in 
history it becomes difficult to identify fairly clear-cut 
mathematical subcommunities. One can identify the community 
of all mathematicians, but even this is partly coextensive 
with the community of astronomers and of physicists. There 
is the danger of a rather "presentist" approach to history. 
Thus the concept should be used with some care (but it should 
be used). In treating mathematical disciplines it should be 
established whether there was a corresponding community that 
can be identified (which can be done by the inspection of the 
communication between the members). Then there is the question 
as to which of the common commitments are specific to the sub- 
community. Here is the connection to the concept of discipli- 
nary matrix, which is the complement to that of the scientific 
community. 
2.2.7. Disciplinary matrix 
In the preceding sections I have frequently used the word 
"background" in talking of the common commitments of the mem- 
bers of the mathematical community. This background is meant 
by the concept of disciplinary matrix. The concept is the 
main tool for analysis of the common background and at the same 
time it is of high explanatory power for historiography of 
mathematics. 
The disciplinary knowledge of a mathematician consists 
of theories, theorems, methods of proof, methods of presen- 
tations, a symbolism, a terminology, and so on. Furthermore 
there is a set of beliefs concerning the general value of 
mathematics, what it is about, and more things like that. 
Then there exist values about the aesthetics of mathematics, 
the role of applications, methods of proof, etc. This com- 
plicated and far reaching background is a bit different for 
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each individual. But it is acquired in a learning process 
in a given social environment on a subject of very definite 
structure , mathematics. Consequently, there is a strong common 
background of the members of the mathematical community. The 
community bonds are the different types of communication, books, 
Papers, correspondence, etc., the basis of which is the common 
1 anguage , the common knowledge and the common commitments, in 
short, the disciplinary matrix. Thus the disciplinary matrix 
has an important social function for the community and an 
emotional function for the individual member. The mathematician 
who sticks to the common commitments of his group can feel 
safe; he secures his identity by relying on the disciplinary 
matrix. This phenomenon explains a large group of Crowe’s 
“laws” as will be shown in section 4. 
The disciplinary matrix determines the things the mathe- 
matical community is rather conservative about. At the same 
time it is the guideline for normal mathematics. 
2.2.8. The elements of the disciplinary matrix 
For a closer investigation of historical developments 
there should be some treatment of the important elements of 
the disciplinary matrix. To do this convincingly one should 
try to classify the different elements that are determinant 
for the work of mathematicians. Evidence for the importance 
of the categories must be given. The ways mathematicians 
acquire the beliefs, norms, etc., should be investigated, and 
furthermore the priorities in the matrix and the interdependence 
of its elements ought to be discussed. Finally there should 
be an attempt to analyze the relation of the matrices at the 
different levels of mathematical communities. This could be 
done in a detailed case study which is not in the scope of 
this paper. I can but give some propostions, raise some ques- 
tions, and give a few examples. 
Of the elements of the disciplinary matrix I shall discuss 
five: beliefs in particular models, values, exemplars (or 
paradigms), concepts, and standard problems. The first three 
have been given by Kuhn. The latter two I believe to be 
specific to mathematics. 
2.2.8.1. Beliefs in particular models 
Here I refer to such “metaphysical” beliefs as “mathematics 
is the science of magnitude”, “arithmetization gives an 
appropriate basis to analysis”, the programmes of formalism, 
logicism, and so on. Such basic beliefs seem to be what Crowe 
has in mind in his “law” 5 [1975, 1631 where he mentions the 
multilayered “knowledge” of mathematicians. There are models 
also in a more heuristic sense, such as the view of a curve 
as the path of a moving point. I am not convinced, though, 
of the usefulness of the latter concept of “model” in the 
his toriography of mathematics . 
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2.2.8.2. Values 
In the history of mathematics values play an important 
role for the mathematical community as well as for the indi- 
vidual mathematician. There are values that belong to the 
larger communities of all scholars such as those R. Merton 
[1968] has explored. The community of mathematicians shares 
values about how research should be done, how results should 
be presented, and about the worth of subjects, methods, and 
problems. One such value of high priority is that mathematical 
innovations should be fruitful and applicable (in mathematics 
or outside of it). The system of values changes historically. 
An interesting question is the comparison of the values of 
fruitfulness and of rigor. The history of imaginary numbers 
shows that fruitfulness dominated rigor. Another instance is 
Dedekind’s statement that he did not publish his ideas on 
irrational number immediately because the matter was “so 
wenig fruchtbar” [1930/32, III, 3161. Rigor as a value gained 
more and more weight during the nineteenth century. This 
development displays two closely connected points about values. 
First, the historical variation of values is determined by the 
material circumstances of life which allow living according 
to such values or not. On the other hand values influence 
these circumstances. Here the second point comes in. In the 
case of the value of rigor it bears the more weight the easier 
it is to exert rigor in mathematical work. These means of 
rigo-rous mathematics have been created by mathematicians like 
Weie-rstrass, Dedekind, Peano and others who valued rigor in 
their work exceptionally highly. Thus there is not only the 
interplay between the values of the mathematical community 
and ithe material circumstances, but also the interaction 
between individual and community values. 
2.2.13.3. Exemplars, paradigms 
The concept of paradigm was from the beginning the most 
spect:acular in Kuhn’s theory. Paradigms are shared examples 
that structure the mathematicians’ perception and guide their 
research. I should like to use the word “paradigm” for 
achievements that govern mathematical development in many ways 
and for a lond period. Examples are the Elements of Euclid, 
Archimedes ’ procedures in caluculus, Gauss’ Disquisitiones 
Arithmeticae, Boole’s Laws of thought, and similar works. A 
paradigm in this sense is much more than a problem solution. 
It embraces basic concepts, standard problem-solutions, a 
specific symbolism and terminology, and often it has a strong 
value-generating force. 
In Boole’s Laws of Thought, for example, the main 
paradigmatic elements were the application of algebraic 
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symbolism and procedures to logic and the treatment of logical 
equations. Unti 1 about 1900 the book was of central influence 
on the development of mathematical logic. By that time a new 
programme was pursued. If we want to speak of a “paradigm” 
in this case, it was generated by various papers and books 
by C. S. Peirce, Dedekind, Frege, Peano, and others. The 
leading principle was no longer the application of mathematics 
to logic but, conversely, the application of the means of sym- 
bolic logic to the foundations of mathematics, which was made 
possible by the results attained in the preceding period. The 
change of paradigms in this case is quite complicated and can 
hardly be termed “revolutionary”. Still there are traces of 
the incommensurability-thesis to be found, as in SchrGder’s 
lack of appreciation of Frege’s aims [cf. Lewis 19661. Maybe 
this type of change of paradigms could be treated in terms 
of Lakatos 1 conception of competing research programmes 
[Lakatos 19731. 
The more restricted types of paradigms, which I shall call 
“exemplars” , are exemplary problem-solutions. One example 
is the geometrical representation of complex numbers which 
acted as an exemplar in the quest for a similar system of space 
analysis resulting in Hamilton’s quaternions [cf. Crowe 1967, 
S-121. The example displays an important trait of exemplars. 
They may suggest solutions of problems quite different from 
the originally solved problem. In the example the problem 
was the “possibility” of imaginary numbers; they were given 
a material substratum by geometrical representati.on. The 
representation is convertible, and what was sought with the 
complex numbers in mind was an algebraical representation of 
three-dimensional space. 
Many exemplars show an important trait of mathematical 
development, namely, the fact that achievements in one field 
act in specific aspects as exemplars to another field. Again, 
the geometrical representation of complex numbers is an example. 
The different interpretations of complex numbers made visible 
the abstract process of interpretation which was taken up by 
the English mathematicians in their conception of a symbolic 
algebra [Novy 1973, 1941. Exemplars influence the mathemati- 
cians ’ way of seeing his subject. This is still clearer in 
the application of the concepts of algebraic number theory 
to algebraic functions. After Dedekind had worked out his 
theory of algebraic numbers fairly thoroughly he perceived 
the similar structure in the realm of algebraic functions. 
In collaboration with H. Weber he worked out the theory of 
algebraic functions strictly along these lines [Dedekind 1930/32, 
283-3501. 
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2.2.8.4. Concepts 
Maybe concep 
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li- ts are the analogy to Kuhn’s symbolic genera 
zations [S]. They certainly play an important role in the 
history of mathematics. The concept of function, e.g., is a 
well known theme of historiography. As elements of the disci- 
plinary matrix concepts are closely connected with values and 
with the beliefs in “metaphysical” models. For the working 
mathematician who does not care much about questions of ontology 
the concepts he knows determine what exists in mathematics. 
From this there arises a, generally implicit, idea of what kind 
of concepts are allowed. The reaction to deviations is indi- 
vidually different; Kronecker is a well known extreme. 
Like exemplars, concepts guide normal mathematics. They 
also set boundaries. In Hamilton’s quest for a vectorial system, 
the prevailing concept of multiplication restricted the possible 
operations to commutative ones. This example will be elaborated 
in connexion with Crowe’s laws below. 
There is much to be said about concepts in mathematics. 
Wussing [1970] has proposed a pattern for the historical develop- 
ment of scientific concepts which is, in aspects, quite intriguing 
and might be applied to the problems of the development of 
disciplinary matrices. 
2.2.8.5. Standard problems 
From the unique prime factorization of natural numbers 
descends a heap of factorization theorems in modern algebra. 
One could consider this as an exemplar, but a new factorization 
theorem in some esoteric branch of modern algebra is not formed 
according to given exemplars. Rather factorization is a well 
known procedure, there are certain techniques, and factorization 
problems are generally recognized as worthwhile objects of 
research. In short, factorization is a standard problem. Further, 
standard problems do not call for a complete solution as given 
by some prototype. This is more clearly visible in the case 
when the problem did not initially find a solution such as the 
word problem in groups and other algebraic structures. Most of 
the “open problems” listed in textbooks are of a standard type. 
Besides factorization, examples are decomposition, representation, 
axiomatization, generalization, etc. These problems are of 
different levels. Generalization, for example, has been con- 
sidered by Wilder [1968, 1731 as an “evolutionary force” in 
mathematics. I should rather not talk of such an everacting 
“force. ” The value “mathematical results should be as general 
as possible” has been of varying weight in the course of history. 
What I have in mind is generalization as a standard procedure 
occuring in the developed mathematics of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. As soon as there is a hierarchy of struc- 
tures, the expansion of theorems valid for one structure to 
the more general one is attempted. In the case of generalization 
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the close relation between values and the standard problems is 
visible. Successfully solved problems (not necessarily standard) 
influence the values about problem choice, and the values deter- 
mine the range of (not the individual) standard problems. Since 
the values about the quality of problems are “tacit”, they are 
acquired through the knowledge of prevailing standard problems. 
The application of the problems is guided by values; much 
generalization is done but not published because it is just 
trivial generalization. There has to be more to i-t, “fruitful- 
nes s” for example. Standard problems are frequently (always?) 
generated by exemplars and they are one of the causes of multiple 
discoveries, in many cases bringing forward new exemplars or 
paradigms. 
2.2.8.6. Further elements 
The elements of the disciplinary matrix are not separated 
sharply. There is strong interaction and interdependence. Thus 
one might structure the matrix by other concepts than mine; this 
is open to discussion. Further elements that might be con- 
sidered and given individual discussion are “symbols”, “methods”, 
and, perhaps “restrictions”. Since I have described models, 
values, and concepts as acting partially restrictively on 
mathematical work, “restrictions” are subsumed there, but it is 
discussible if in certain historical cases this assumption is 
feasible. In the same way the discussion should in general 
include all periods in the history of mathematics (which I have 
not tried to do). 
2.3. Conclusion 
The general pattern of T. Kuhn’s theory of the structure 
of scientific revolutions seems to be not applicable to mathe- 
matics. But many of Kuhn’s conceptions remain valuable for the 
historiography of science even if the basic pattern of the theory 
is rejected. The concepts centering around the sociology of 
groups of scholars are of high explanatory power and--in my 
opinion--supply key conceptions for the historiography of mathe- 
matics. They illuminate the relation of mathematical achieve- 
ments to the contemporary background. In this way they can 
serve to explain and understand them and do more justice to the 
mathematicians of the past, their efforts and failures, than 
the prevailing tendency to view past mathematical achievement 
only in the light of their long-term effects. 
The examples used are almost exclusively from the 19th and 
20th century. I do not insist that the concepts are applicable 
in all cases. I do not wish to make historiography of mathematics 
completely Kuhnian. It should have become clear that I am 
looking for satisfying historical understanding and not for some 
nice theory. Taken in this way, Kuhn’s conceptions and possibly 
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others will serve historical thinking in two ways. First, new 
phenomena come into view, new developments and new causal con- 
nexions are seen. Secondly, the explicit application of a 
conceptual background makes discussible the usually completely 
implicit presuppositions on which the historiography of mathe- 
matics is founded. Thus it is useful to have different systems 
that can shed light on history and historiography of mathematics 
from many different angles. 
The concepts developed thus far must be completed in dif- 
ferent ways. Of these the role of extramathematical social 
influences is discussed in the next section. The final section 
will show what I have called the explanatory power of the con- 
cepts by discussing the regularities of the history of mathe- 
matics which have been stated by Crowe in his “laws”. 
3. A Necessary Supplement: The External Social Background 
One of the weaknesses of Kuhn’s conceptions correlating 
with the strong idealization of the scientific community is 
the lack of consideration of extradisciplinary influences. I 
have already pointed to the interaction of the mathematical 
disciplines, and there is much to be said about the relations 
of mathematics to nonmathematical factors ranging from astronomy 
to the general material conditions of society. 
I shall confine myself to the imbedding of the mathematical 
community in society. The social position of the mathematician 
and his community is dependent on the structure of society and 
its development. Consequently, the development of mathematics 
is not independent from the fact that the mathematicians are 
amateurs, philosophers, civi 1 servants, academi.cians or univer- 
si ty teachers. By the way, in my view the social status of 
the mathematicians in society is a proper part of the history 
of mathematics. 
As Ben-David argues [1971, 6-161 there might be no systematic 
influence of society on the contents of the sciences; but, as 
his book amply illustrates, the social structure of society 
is a precondition for the establishment of a scientific role 
that is the basis of a scientific tradition. The specialization 
of Ben-David’s lines of inquiry to the mathematician is a 
worthy subject for study. 
As to the social status of the members of the scientific 
community and its influence on the development of mathematics, I 
I point to two examples. The first is given by J. Needham [1956, 
19641. By a comparison of the social structures and the scien- 
tific (and mathematical) traditions of China and Western Europe 
in the scientific renaissance, he shows that the structure of 
society has been a factor in the rise of the New Science that 
fused mathematics and nature-knowledge. He argues that the fact 
that the Chinese scholars were part of the bureaucratic system 
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was unfavorable to such a development, while it was favoured 
by the status of the men of knowledge in the mercantile society 
of the West. It should be added that Needham's papers do not 
try to prove that connection but rather give tentative arguments. 
Still they are a convincing contribution to the debate on the 
causes of the scientific renaissance, and they apply to mathe- 
matics as well as to the natural sciences. 
My second example alludes to Crowe's "law" 4, which states 
that rigor in mathematical theories is frequently acquired 
only late in the historical development. The given evidence 
points mainly to the facts that fruitfulness is a higher value 
than rigor and that the 19th and 20th century brought about 
higher standards of rigor. I shall try to give tentative ex- 
planation of the latter fact. The mathematical community of 
the 18th century consisted of scholars and practitioners. The 
two groups were already quite separated, but connexions still 
existed. The ways to ensure material security were varied and 
often difficult [cf. Duveen/Hahn 19571. The institutional 
basis of the community were the academies and scientific societies 
The academies institutionally joined mathematics and its fields 
of applications. Furthermore the political status of the acade- 
mies gave them the twofold task of the quest for truth and the 
production of useful knowledge. Thus the mathematicians were 
concerned with "applied" mathematics, too, so that, e.g. the 
results of higher calculus had a ready and strong justification 
although they rested on a doubtful basis. 
By the beginning of the 19th century a new social class 
had become dominant. In consequence of this change the system 
of education was modified and strengthened. The French revo- 
lution led to the establishment of the Ecole Polytechnique and 
the Ecole Normale which were of enormous significance in the 
history of mathematics. France was the center of mathematics 
and science at the turn of the century, it was the model for 
scholars in other countries. The German university reform, 
starting with the foundation of the university of Berlin 1809, 
merged traces of the French model with specifically German 
philosophical ideas and, most important, was an attempt to 
establish the autonomy of scholars without violating the bounda- 
ries set by the political state of the German countries. The 
scientists did not take part in the reform; still it turned out 
to be very favourable to the development of mathematics and 
natural sciences. The main point is that the teaching was done 
to students who could stay at the university to become professors 
of mathematics. The institutional background was provided by 
the Institute and Seminare that were founded during the century. 
Thus the mathematicians could teach the mathematics they were 
themselves working on. 
These developments influenced the relation of pure and 
applied mathematics in many ways. First, the connection of 
mathematics to technology was cut off by the separation of 
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Technische Hochschulen and universities. Thus, e.g., descrip- 
tive geometry disappeared from the university curriculum. 
Secondly, the model of the foundations of Seminare was the 
mathematisch-physikalisches Seminar of KBnigsberg; its fourth 
follower, the important Seminar of Berlin was already purely 
mathematical. The institutional structure tended to separate 
fields, and thus pure mathematics was favoured. Thirdly, the 
teaching of students as potential mathematicians had two effects 
On one hand the mathematicians could teach things they were 
interested in, and the teaching got swiftly up to the level of 
actua 1 research, thus forming a strong tradition. On the other 
hand, the mathematicians turned their professional interest to 
the things they were teaching, and thus became more concerned 
about the elementary parts of their disciplines. 
In summary, the bonds to the fields of application were 
loosened, there was a firm social status for the mathematician, 
and the main task was the recruitment of the next generation 
of mathematicians. The first generation of university mathe- 
maticians was still concerned with applied mathematics, too; 
the later generations turned more and more to pure mathematics. 
That means mathematics turned to itself. This fact together 
with the effects and the needs of the new style of university 
teaching turned rigor into a value of high priority. 
This rough sketch of an explanation of the development of 
rigor in the mathematics of the 19th century can be completed 
by evidence from many details. For some of these cf. Ben-David 
[1971, Ch. 71 and Lorey [1916]. My explanation gives only part 
of the truth. There are intramathematical factors as well, 
which are not discussed here. 
4. The Explanation of Crowe's "Laws" 
In his “laws” M. J. Crowe [1975] has described some regu- 
larities in the history of mathematics. He did not try to 
explain these regularities. Many of them can be explained in 
terms of the concepts developed in the preceding sections of 
this paper. I shall do this to show how the concepts can be 
applied and, more generally, to show the importance of the 
sociology of the mathematical community in the history of 
mathematics. Furthermore the mere statement of such regulari- 
ties is not of much worth to historiography, there has to be 
some theoretical framing. 
Some of the “laws” have already been discussed. The state- 
ment that “revolutions never occur in mathematics” (law 10) has 
to be judged according to if and how one uses the term “revolu- 
tion!‘. There is nothing to explain about it. The same applies 
to the term “crisis”. Crowe states that mathematicians possess 
techniques to handle logical contradictions and thereby prevent 
crises (law 9). Such techniques belong to the disciplinary 
knowledge. A closer analysis of the “law” throws up thorny 
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philosophical questions on mathematics that are not at stake here 
Another statement on the disciplinary knowledge is that "the 
'knowledge' possessed by mathematicians concerning mathematics 
at any point in time is multilayered" and that there exists a 
"metaphysics" to mathematics (law 5). This has been discussed 
and specified at due length in the sections 2.2.8. and 2.2.7. 
on the disciplinary matrix and its elements. 
A group of "laws" may be treated in connection with Crowe's 
own main example, the history of vector analysis. "New mathe- 
matical concepts frequently come forth . . . against the efforts 
of the mathematicians who create them" (law 1). This formula- 
tion might be elegant, but it is misleading. Take Hamilton's 
invention of quaternions. Hamilton certainly did not struggle 
against quaternions and quaternions did not come forth by them- 
selves. Hamilton's work was guided by the exemplar of complex 
numbers and one of the elements of the disciplinary matrix of 
his time said that multiplication was a commutative operation. 
Only after a long time of strenuous work did Hamilton abandon 
commutativity and find quaternions [Crowe 19671. The problem 
Hamilton attacked was normal mathematics [ibid., 121. But it 
could not be solved in a normal way, it grew into an anomaly. 
For a man like Hamilton who stubbornly stuck to the problem 
for many years it is highly probable that in course of time he 
would try lines of thought that deviate more and more from the 
usual ways. Thus to find a solution like quaternions presupposes 
much time and effort, necessary for dissociating from the 
restrictions of the accepted beliefs and concepts. This, I 
think, is what Crowe calls the struggle against new concepts. 
"Many new mathematical concepts . . . meet forceful resis- 
tance after their appearance and achieve acceptance only after 
an extended period of time" (law 2). The mathematical community, 
like the creator of a new concept, only reluctantly abandons 
some of its accepted beliefs and concepts. This could be seen 
functionally. A light-handed use of new concepts that break 
with many implicit restrictions and beliefs would endanger the 
very basis of the communication of the community. Furthermore 
most mathematicians are concerned solely with normal mathematics 
and take no pains to understand and appreciate new and peculiar 
concepts and theories. Thus it takes a long time until an 
unusual concept like that of quaternions is accepted, and some- 
times inventions are overlooked completely. 
"The fame of the creator of a new mathematical concept has 
a powerful . . . role in the acceptance of that . . . concept, at 
least if the new concept breaks with traditions" (law 6). Re- 
putation has been considered as functional in many ways by 
sociologists of science. The main point is, that reputation en- 
sures disciplinary competence of a member of the mathematical 
community. As to the cited "law", this plainly means that for 
simple reasons of economy the members of the mathematical 
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community are more willing to spend time on the non-normal work 
of a famous mathematician than on that of an outsider. This is 
even more so when, as in the case of Hamilton and Grassman, the 
work of the outsider even looks strange and outsiderish. 
“New mathematical creations frequently arise within . . . 
contexts far larger than the preserved contents of these 
creations; . ..I’ (law 7). A new concept or theory as it is worked 
out by an outsider or a mathematician who has in a long course 
of work drifted away from the normal paths and has connected 
different ideas in unusual ways will very probably be framed in 
a peculiar, personal way. Furthermore, the mathematician who 
breaks with traditions and violates accepted beliefs tends to 
put something else in its place. He will either interpret his 
creations in a way to make them as compatible as possible with 
the contemporary disciplinary matrix, or he will draw up--as 
justification--a philosophy of his own, which helps him to keep 
his professional identity, and which will be closely connected 
with the new concept or theory. The same process will--in other 
forms--take place collectively in the process of acceptance by 
the mathematical community. Many of the peculiarities will be 
done away with, but some piece of what is not the “content” 
(again, what is it?) may become a common possession. 
“Multiple independent discoveri’es of mathematical concepts 
are the rule, not the exception.” (law 8). Crowe points to his 
“laws” 2 and 7 for a partial explanation. I can understand this 
only in the sense that the extended period of acceptance of new 
concepts gives room for independent discoveries, but this is a 
minor point as to the explanation of multiples. I do not pre- 
tend to be able to come forth with a general explanation for 
multiples in the history of mathematics; each one is different 
and each is multifactored. But the fact that multiple discoverie: 
are frequent is a strong point in arguing that the interaction 
of the mathematicians in their community is the vital basis of 
the development of mathematics. The fact that discoveries are 
“in the air” can only be rationally explained by the contempo- 
rary disciplinary matrix, the combination of certain elements 
of which, like exemplars, concepts, problems, values, plus the 
existence of anomalies and, maybe, extramathematical influences 
make possible the rise of certain new concepts. Again the his- 
tory of vector analysis is an example. Crowe speaks of a “trend” 
or a “movement” [1967, 48, 2481 which evolved from different 
traditions. A comparative study considering the relation of 
each attempt to the contemporary background ought to throw more 
light on the causes of this “trend”. To end this discussion of 
the “laws” connected with the history of vector analysis I 
should like to add that Crowe’s book is--in the light of the 
viewpoints held in this paper--an excellent piece of history of 
mathematics. 
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“Although the demands of logic, consistency, and rigor 
have at times urged the rejection of some concepts now accepted, 
the usefulness of these concepts has repeatedly forced mathe- 
maticians to accept and to tolerate them, . . .” (law 3). This 
regularity in the history of mathematics should be explained 
in terms of the basic beliefs and values of the mathematical 
community . I have argued above that fruitfulness is a value 
of higher priority than rigor. Furthermore, there is the gener- 
ally implicit belief that mathematics is concerned with the 
solution of problems. Even if at times it might seem that the 
mathematical community, or part of it, is aiming at the construc- 
tion of nice theories, in the case of Crowe’s example, the 
imaginary numbers, mathematics was aimed at problem-solutions 
and those impossible numbers were an important solution. Question 
of foundations and of ontology are left to the philosphers or 
to philosophically minded mathematicians, who are tolerated as 
the adressee for uncomfortable questions that do not concern 
the true mathematics. What the true mathematics is varies 
through history and can be seen only as a common consent of the 
mathematical community that cannot be sharply delimited. 
I have in section 3 given an interpretative idea about the 
emergence of rigor, to which Crowe’s “law” 4 alludes. Crowe 
states that the rigor of textbook presentation is frequently 
a late acquisition, rather forced upon than sought by the pio-, 
neers of the field. It may be added in explanation that before 
the textbook presentation of a subject there frequently is a 
period of normal mathematics in the field. In this period 
attention is given to the details and especially to those points 
which do not accord with the standards of the mathematical 
community , and thus rigor is forced upon the presentation of the 
sub j ect . 
NOTES 
1. Foundation crises have been treated by J. Thiel [1972]. 
He starts with a basically social definition of “crisis”, seems 
to forget about it, and ends up in a systematic, philosophical 
discussion. The book is historically unsatisfying. S. Bochner, 
in a paper [1963] on Kuhn’s book, even holds the mathematical 
foundation crises to be revolutions, without giving much evi- 
dence to the point. The considerable main point of his paper 
is the role of the mathematical paradigm in physics. 
2. J. Hiippner and myself have in a course on the foundation 
crises of mathematics (Hamburg, 1973) tried to apply the concepts 
of Kuhn and Thiel. The discussion showed both to be inadequate 
as generalization of the historical facts as well as a guide- 
line for historical inquiry. 
3. In an exploratory study of the social features of mathe- 
matical problem solving Ch. S. Fisher [1972/3] has given an 
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interesting description of the contemporary mathematical 
community which he describes as quite diffuse. 
4. This example comes from my research on the prehistory 
of lattice theory. 
5. H. J. M. Bos remarked on this statement that it shows 
the intrinsic difference between science and mathematics: science 
uses symbolic generalizations of something, mathematics studies 
symbolic generalizations themselves--they are the concepts. 
6. Possible doubts as to the correctness of this story in 
t.he case of Kummer do not weaken the argument. Cf. Edwards, H. M 
“The Background of Kummer’s Proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem for 
Regular Primes .‘I Archive for History of Exact Sciences 14(1973), 
219-236. 
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